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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion has undeniably
changed the rules of the arbitration game.1 To supporters of the decision, Concepcion finally put
an end to judicial use of common law principles to undermine the enforceability of many
arbitration agreements.2 Such judicial incursions into the realm of arbitration had increasingly
left arbitration on unequal footing with all other contracts.3 To critics of the decision,
Concepcion served as a crushing blow to consumer protection on the one hand and principles of

*

Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; Associate Director of the Diane and
Guilford Glazer Institute for Jewish Studies; J.D., Yale Law School, 2007; Ph.D., Yale Political Science Department,
2009. I would like to thank Aaron Bruhl, Christopher Drahozal, and David Horton as well the participants in Penn
State Law School’s symposium U.S. Arbitration Law in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion for their helpful
insights and comments.
1
For a comprehensive discussion of the recent flurry of Supreme Court arbitration decisions, see Thomas J.
Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American
Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323 (2012).
2
In recent years, a number of articles have criticized the increased judicial use of unconscionability to void
otherwise valid arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the
Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 39 (2006) (arguing that California courts improperly apply lower standards of unconscionability in
determining the enforceability of arbitration agreements than in resolving other contractual issues); Steven J. Burton,
The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to
Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469 (arguing that many courts favor litigation over arbitration by erroneously applying
the unconscionability doctrine to strike down arbitration agreements); Eric J. Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration
and Unconscionability, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 761 (2003) (arguing against attempts to broadly apply the
unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements).
3
See supra note 2.
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federalism on the other.4 By restricting the use of common law principles to invalidate arbitration
agreements, the Supreme Court stripped lower courts of the meager judicial tools in their arsenal
that could prevent arbitration from engulfing the entirety of employee and consumer claims.5
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision provides ample reason to conclude that Concepcion
has fundamentally altered the way lower courts apply the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to
arbitration agreements. Most notably, the Court provided a narrow reading of § 2 of the FAA and
an expansive reading of the FAA’s purpose, thereby refusing to allow lower courts to invalidate
arbitration provisions on common law grounds where doing so would “stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA’s objective.”6 Indeed, many decisions issued by lower courts on the
heels of the Court’s decision in Concepcion further bolster the impression that the rules of the
arbitration game have been radically transformed for the foreseeable future.7
However, while Concepcion will have a far-reaching impact on the enforceability of
arbitration agreements going forward, there is good reason to believe that this impact will not be
quite as far reaching as some have presumed. Notwithstanding some of the Court’s sweeping
statements in the decision, this Article aims to highlight why Concepcion covers less legal terrain
and fewer cases than you might otherwise think. In so doing, it hopes to sketch three limits to
how Concepcion will impact the enforceability of arbitration agreements and thereby outline
some of the litigation fault lines that are beginning to appear in a post-Concepcion world.8
First, the Court’s opinion in Concepcion focuses largely on how the “Discover Bank
rule,” in knee-jerk fashion, allowed plaintiffs to avoid arbitration agreements with class-action
waivers so long as the contract was adhesive, the damages were predictably small, and the
consumer alleged a scheme to cheat consumers.9 Such a sweeping rule did not take into account
the variety of provisions in AT&T’s form contract that, at least facially, provided plaintiffs with
an alternative mechanism to resolve individualized disputes.10 Accordingly, lower courts may
read the majority’s decision as holding the Discover Bank rule was preempted by the FAA
because it was too broad; it provided plaintiffs too much leeway to void otherwise valid

4

See, e.g., Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2011) (citing
Concepcion as an example of how state law is “losing ground in the U.S. Supreme Court”). Critics of the Supreme
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence have for some time argued that the Court’s decisions have severely undermined
principles of federalism. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The
Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 54 (2004) (“Southland and its progeny
are the result of bad statutory interpretation and even worse federalism.”). For a discussion of the central importance of
federalism in the arbitration scheme, see Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role
in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 176 (2002).
5
See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme
Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 463 (2011) (“Finally, the Court appears to have
placed the nail in the coffin on consumers’ ability to pursue class processes when bound by an arbitration agreement in
AT&T v. Concepcion.”).
6
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
7
See infra note 32.
8
I do not discuss the “vindication-of-rights” doctrine – maybe the most celebrated potential limitation on the
Court’s holding in Concepcion – which has already been applied post-Concepcion by the Second Circuit to render a
class-action waiver unenforceable. See In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011);
see also David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights Doctrine, 60 KANSAS L.
REV. (forthcoming 2012) (outlining the origins of and theory behind the vindication of rights doctrine).
9
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.
10
See id. at 1744-45.
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arbitration agreements simply because they contained a class-action waiver without considering
pro-consumer provisions in the same agreement.11 Reading the Court’s opinion in Concepcion in
this way narrows its impact by empowering courts to continue to use common law contract rules
to invalidate agreements which fail to adequately protect consumers.
Second, reading Concepcion as severely undermining the viability of common law
contract defenses to invalidate arbitration agreements underestimates the impact of Justice
Thomas’s concurrence on the precedential value of the decision. While Justice Thomas did sign
the majority opinion, his concurrence provides a wholly distinct – and in some instances, more
limiting – ground for reaching the result outlined in majority’s opinion.12 Indeed, Justice Thomas
joined the majority’s invalidation of the Discover Bank rule because he held that § 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act did not empower lower courts to employ defenses such as public policy
or substantive unconscionability to revoke otherwise valid arbitration agreements.13 However,
Justice Thomas presumably remains of the view that a class action waiver may serve as a factor
in invalidating an arbitration agreement so long as the primary consideration in invalidating the
agreement is some form of procedural unconscionability that speaks to the failure of the
agreement’s formation.14 As a technical matter, by signing the majority opinion, Justice Thomas
did provide five votes for the majority’s rationale.15 However, similar concurring opinions such
as Thomas’s – those that differ so explicitly with the majority – can have a significant impact on
how lower courts apply the majority’s decision.16 Indeed, we are already beginning to see lower
courts lean on Thomas’s concurrence in applying Concepcion.17 In this way, Thomas’s
concurrence may very well limit Concepcion’s precedential value.
Third, given the “strategic judging” that animates judicial interpretation of arbitration
doctrine,18 the tenuous nature of the Court’s majority will likely effect state court application of
Concepcion. Most notably, because Justice Thomas has consistently contended that the FAA
only applies in federal courts,19 state courts are likely aware that there are not enough votes on the
Supreme Court to reverse a state court decision aggressively applying common law contract
principles to invalidate an arbitration agreement. Accordingly, state court judges are likely to
push back on the Court’s holding in Concepcion, limiting its application in order to retain
authority over the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Indeed, the first round of California
state courts applying Concepcion already provide some indication that state courts are likely to be
more aggressive in rejecting a broad reading of the Court’s holding.20

11

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
13
See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
15
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743.
16
See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
17
See infra note 102.
18
See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal
Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1420, 1420 (2008).
19
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
20
See, e.g., Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 856, 865 (Ct. App. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11880, 2012 WL 136923 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012); Macintosh v. Powered, Inc., No. A129063, 2011 WL 2237938, (Cal. Ct.
App. June 8, 2011).
12
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II.

PURPOSE

For many, the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion not only
undermined the viability of class action lawsuits,21 but it also severely undermined principles of
federalism by limiting the ability of states to create limitations that hamper the enforceability of
arbitration provisions.22 Indeed, there was much in the Supreme Court’s decision that supported
such dire conclusions – most notably, the Court’s treatment both of the FAA’s purpose and its
determination of disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.
First, the Court focused on the “principal purpose” of the FAA, describing it “as
embod[ying] [a] national policy favoring arbitration . . . and a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary.”23 Contrary to the contentions of the dissent,24 the Court’s majority argued that part of
the FAA’s objective was to create “streamlined proceedings and expeditious results”25 and not to
“frustrate” or “hinder” the “speedy resolution of [] controvers[ies].”26
Second, and in turn, the Court took aim at the “Discover Bank rule,” a rule announced by
the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,27 which was “California’s rule
classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”28 The
Court concluded that the Discover Bank rule was preempted by the FAA because it “interfere[d]
with arbitration” by enabling “any party to a consumer contract to demand [classwide arbitration]
ex post.”29 In finding that the Discover Bank rule was preempted by the FAA, the Court focused
on how such a rule had a “disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements,” citing various
statistical studies that demonstrated how unconscionability had been used by California courts to
target and void arbitration agreements.
In this way, the Court determined that the Discover Bank rule applied the doctrine of
unconscionability in a manner that disfavored arbitration and represented a prime example of a
state law doctrine that was preempted by the FAA.30 Accordingly, the Court emphasized that
standard state law contract defenses would be preempted by the FAA where they created hurdles
to the enforceability of arbitration provisions that “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to
arbitrate.”31 Such a holding could be read to not only endanger judicial use of unconscionability
to void arbitration agreements, but also the use of other state laws that similarly apply common

21

See, e.g., Cole, supra note 5, at 467 (“The Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T v. Concepcion, in which
the Court held that the FAA preempts a state court decision mandating that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable
if the consumer with a low value claim is not permitted to proceed in a class arbitration, sounds the death knell for the
class arbitration process.”); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Supreme Court Case Could End Class-Action Suits, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 7, 2010, at E8, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/11/06/INA41G6I3I.DTL (arguing that the Court’s decision in Concepcion could end class
actions).
22
See, e.g., supra note 4.
23
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
24
See id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
25
Id. at 1749 (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357-58 (2008)).
26
Id. (quoting Preston, 552 U.S. at 358).
27
113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
28
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
29
Id. at 1750.
30
See id. 1744.
31
Id. (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)).
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law principles to limit the scope of enforceable arbitration agreements. In the wake of
Concepcion, some lower courts have latched on to these portions of the Court’s opinion and
thereby applied Concepcion broadly.32
But the majority’s opinion, while it did contain much broad language, was also a creature
of its facts. The Court addressed the enforceability of the arbitration provision in AT&T
Mobility’s agreement for the sale and servicing of cellular phones. The agreement itself
contained a number of unique provisions that structured specific methods for the resolution of
disputes between the company and its customers. The agreement33 provided that customers could
initiate proceedings to resolve a dispute via a one-page online form.34 After receiving the form,
the dispute resolution system created by the agreement allowed AT&T to offer the customer a
settlement to resolve the claim. If the claim remained unresolved for 30 days, the customer could
submit another online form demanding arbitration.35
Importantly, the terms of the arbitration were significantly constrained by the agreement
in a variety of ways that, at least on their face, provided significant protections for consumers.36
AT&T was required to pay all the costs of non-frivolous claims.37 The arbitration had to take
place in the county where the consumer was billed.38 In addition, for all claims of $10,000 or
less, the customer was empowered to have the arbitration proceed either by telephone or to be
decided based solely on submissions from the parties – in fact, for claims of such a size, either
party could bring the claim in small claims court instead of pursuing arbitration.39 Moreover, the
agreement prohibited AT&T from seeking reimbursement of attorney’s fees and “in the event that

32

See, e.g., Cardenas v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., No. 09-4978 SBA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78282, at *7-8 (N.D.
Cal. July 19, 2011) (holding that Concepcion preempts California state decisional law that found certain claims for
injunctive relief under various consumer protection laws and unfair competition laws were not arbitrable); Nelson v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, No. C10-4802 TEH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92290 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2011) (same); Wolf v.
Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., No. 10-cv-3338, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66649, at *19-20 (D.N.J. June 22, 2011)
(“Based on the United States Supreme Court’s holding and reasoning in AT&T Mobility, the Court cannot find that any
public interest articulated in this case, either in connection with the SCRA or New Jersey law, overrides the clear,
unambiguous, and binding class action waiver included in the parties’ arbitration agreement. New Jersey precedent
notwithstanding, the Court is bound by the controlling authority of the United States Supreme Court.”); Bernal v.
Burnett, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (D. Colo. 2011) (“Thus, the Supreme Court considered the fact that the
Concepcions and other class plaintiffs would be denied any recovery by its ruling, and ruled against the class plaintiffs
nonetheless. The Court is bound by this ruling and, therefore, cannot be persuaded in this case by the fact that ordering
the parties to arbitration may impact Plaintiffs’ ability to recover.”); Alfeche v. Cash Am. Int'l, Inc., No. 09-0953, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90085, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2011) (“The FAA preempts Pennsylvania’s unconscionability law
with regard to class action waivers in arbitration agreements.”); Ipcon Collections LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No.
7:10-cv-9012, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95468, at *13 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2011) (“Plaintiff argues in its opposition
that this case asks the question ‘[w]ill an entity with overwhelming economic power escape accountability before the
court system after it has implemented a fraudulent scheme, and been complicitous in other fraudulent activities which
have destroyed a business, the lives of people working in that business and taken away their homes.’ However, the
Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, makes clear that the parties’ respective sizes or
economic power are irrelevant in determining whether an arbitration provision should be enforced.” (citation omitted)).
33
The court actually was addressing a revised agreement, executed by AT&T pursuant to its contractual authority
to make unilateral amendments to its agreement with cellular customers. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
34
See id.
35
See id.
36
See id.
37
See id.
38
See id.
39
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
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a customer receives an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last written settlement offer” the
agreement required AT&T “to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and twice the amount of the
claimant’s attorney’s fees.”40
While some lower courts have explicitly disregarded the factual context of the decision,41
successfully extracting the holding from Concepcion would appear to require more attention to
the pro-consumer provisions in the AT&T agreement. Indeed, it is worth noting that the target of
the Court’s analysis was not the underlying agreement implicated in the litigation, but whether
the Discover Bank rule was preempted by the FAA.42 The Court’s holding, as well, was directed
at the Discover Bank rule, which the Court held did not provide adequate safeguards against
enabling each and every plaintiff to ex post void all arbitration agreements with class-action
waivers.43
The Court’s critique largely focuses on the fact that the Discover Bank rule allows
plaintiffs to avoid arbitration agreements with class-action waivers so long as the contract
satisfied three requirements: (1) the contract is adhesive, (2) the damages are predictably small,
and (3) the consumer alleges a scheme to cheat consumers.44 The Court noted that plaintiffs
could all too easily satisfy these three requirements: consumer contracts are almost always
adhesive in some sense, California courts had deemed damages of $4,000 to be sufficiently
“small,” and the scheme to cheat need not be proven, but only alleged, to satisfy the Discover
Bank rule.45 Accordingly, the Court referred to these requirements as “toothless and malleable,”
failing to providing any true “limiting effect” on the Discover Bank rule.46
In this way, the Court’s concern appeared to rest primarily with the wide scope of the
Discover Bank rule and the fact that it enabled plaintiffs to easily avoid the terms of a duly
executed arbitration provision.47 This was particularly startling in the case before the Court
where AT&T – at least facially – had incorporated a variety of pro-consumer provisions in the
arbitration agreement. Accordingly, the pro-consumer provisions could have been read to
counteract the impact of the class action waiver in AT&T’s arbitration agreement. And the
Discover Bank rule, as articulated by the California Supreme Court, failed to account for these
pro-consumer provisions, using an all-too simplistic checklist to determine whether an arbitration
agreement was unconscionable. As the Court noted, the district court below had described
AT&T’s arbitration procedures “favorably”48 and yet within the framework created by the
Discover Bank rule, such favorable provisions had no impact on the unconscionability analysis.

40

Id.
See Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 07-00411, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106783, at *17 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 20, 2011) (“[I]t is incorrect to read Concepcion as allowing plaintiffs to avoid arbitration agreements on a caseby-case basis simply by providing individualized evidence about the costs and benefits at stake.”).
42
See id. at *9-10 (describing the Court’s holding as “California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA”
and remanding the case).
43
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 (“Although the rule does not require classwide [sic] arbitration, it allows
any party to a consumer contract to demand it ex post.”).
44
See id.
45
See id.
46
Id.
47
It is also worth noting that this more limited interpretation of the Court’s holding is further bolstered by the
Court’s order. The Court did not simply grant AT&T’s motion to compel, but instead, limited its holding to finding
that the Discover Bank rule was preempted and then remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 1753.
48
Id. at 1745.
41
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On such an interpretation, the problem with the Discover Bank rule was its failure to take
a holistic approach to arbitration agreements; instead, the Discover Bank rule made it too easy for
plaintiffs to demand ex post invalidation of an arbitration agreement that contained a class-action
waiver. If we read Concepcion this way then there is no reason to conclude that the Court’s
decision rang the death knell for class actions or even the ability of common law contract
defenses to render arbitration agreements unenforceable.49 To fit within the requirements of
Concepcion, an arbitration agreement would have to incorporate various pro-plaintiff provisions
that provided genuine access to reasonably priced dispute resolution system – as AT&T had in its
own arbitration agreement.
In this way, the Court’s decision in Concepcion did not run counter to the long-standing
principle – embodied in § 2 of the FAA – that arbitration provisions “shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”50 The Supreme Court had previously interpreted the second part of the sentence – the
so-called “savings clause” – to allow “[s]tates [to] regulate contracts, including arbitration
clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause ‘upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’”51 The power of
courts to use common law contract principles – including unconscionability – to invalidate
arbitration agreements remained intact post-Concepcion.
By contrast, judicial application of the Discover Bank rule had taken to targeting
arbitration agreements through failure to consider them in their entirety when applying
unconscionability. In turn, the Discover Bank rule ran afoul of the general principle that
arbitration agreements could not be singled out for worse treatment than any other contract. As
the Court had previously noted, “[w]hat States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough
to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration
clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place
arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’ directly contrary to the Act’s language and Congress’
intent.”52
Indeed, in a recent en banc decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri followed this
approach in limiting the impact of Concepcion. After having its prior decision vacated and
remanded by the Supreme Court in light of Concepcion,53 the Missouri Supreme Court held that
while “the presence and enforcement of [a] class arbitration waiver does not make the arbitration
clause unconscionable,” a court may still find an agreement with a class arbitration waiver
unconscionable by “looking at the agreement as a whole to determine the conscionability of the
arbitration provision.”54 Thus, the Missouri Supreme Court emphasized that “the majority
opinion [in Concepcion] discusses in detail the many ways in which the arbitration provisions at
issue in Concepcion are fair and reasonable and do not lead to an unconscionable result.”55 It

49

See, e.g, Ashby Jones, After AT&T Ruling, Should We Say Goodbye to Consumer Class Actions?, WALL ST. J.
L. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/27/after-att-ruling-should-we-say-goodbye-toconsumer-class-actions/.
50
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
51
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
52
Id.
53
Missouri Title Loans, Inc. v. Brewer, No. 10-1027, 2011 WL 531553 (U.S. May 2, 2011).
54
Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, No. SC 90647, 2012 WL 716878, at *1 (Mo. Mar. 6, 2012) (en banc).
55
Id.
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would therefore be a mistake to read Concepcion, argued the court, to conclude simply because
“the Discover Bank rule was preempted by the [FAA] . . . that all state law unconscionability
defenses are preempted by the [FAA] in all cases.”56 In this way, the Missouri Supreme Court’s
decision in Brewer serves as one of the first and clearest statements of Concepcion’s potential
limitations, holding that the FAA “preemption analysis requires a case-specific assessment of the
arbitration contract at issue.”57
In sum, it seems fair to read the majority’s decision as holding the Discover Bank rule
preempted by the FAA because it was too broad and provided plaintiffs too much leeway to void
otherwise valid arbitration agreements simply because they contained a class-action waiver –
even without considering pro-consumer provisions in the same agreement. Going forward, courts
may be reluctant to apply the Court’s holding in Concepcion where a particular arbitration
agreement satisfies the three requirements of the Discover Bank rule – that is, it is adhesive,
involves small amounts of damages, and is accompanied by allegations of a scheme to cheat
consumers – but fails to provide other pro-consumer provisions which could counter-balance the
effect of the class-action waiver. As a result, Concepcion may be read to require lower courts to
determine whether an arbitration agreement – taking all of its provisions into account – actually
has the effect of, to use the dissent’s phrasing, “depriving claimants of their claims.”58

III.

PRECEDENT

A more nuanced reading of the majority’s opinion is not the only reason to think that
Concepcion covers less than we might think. While five justices signed the majority opinion,59 it
is far from clear whether a majority of the Court agreed with the majority opinion’s logic.
Although Justice Thomas signed on to the majority opinion, he also filed a concurring opinion
providing an alternative interpretation of the FAA.60 In explaining why he had signed the
majority opinion notwithstanding his alternative reading of the FAA, Justice Thomas stated that
he joined the majority only “reluctantly” and had done so because “the Court’s test will often lead
to the same outcome as my textual interpretation.”61
But Justice Thomas is unambiguous in his concurrence that his interpretation of the FAA
is quite different than the interpretation expressed in the majority opinion. For Thomas, the scope
of § 2’s savings clause derives from a careful parsing of the text. On the one hand, § 2 of the
FAA states clearly that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”62
By contrast, when the FAA expresses the exceptions to the validity of arbitration awards, it
simply states “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”63 In the words of Justice Thomas, “[t]he use of only ‘revocation’ and the conspicuous
omission of ‘invalidation’ and ‘nonenforcement’ suggest that the exception does not include all

56

Id.
Id.
58
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59
See id. at 1743.
60
See id. at 1753-56 (Thomas, J., concurring).
61
Id. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
62
Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2) (Thomas, J., concurring).
63
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring)
57
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defenses applicable to any contract but rather some subset of those defenses.”64 In this way,
Justice Thomas argues that the only standard contract defenses applicable to arbitration
agreements are those that “revoke” the arbitration agreement – as opposed to those defenses that
challenge an arbitration agreement’s validity or enforceability.65
Of course, the distinction between revocation on the one hand and validity and
enforceability on the other hand is somewhat murky. To explain the distinction, Thomas looks to
§ 4 of the FAA, which states that “[w]hen a party seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement in
federal court, § 4 requires that ‘upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue,’ the court must order arbitration ‘in
accordance with the terms of the agreement.’”66 The language of § 2, argues Thomas, should be
read in light of the requirements in § 4; the grounds for “revocation” mentioned in § 2 must refer
to the “making of the agreement” mentioned in § 4.67 Thus, § 4 requires a federal court to make
sure that none of the grounds for invalidating an arbitration award – as detailing § 2 – are present
before sending the parties to arbitration.68 Based on this interpretation, Thomas concludes that
“[t]his [interpretation] would require enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate unless a party
successfully asserts a defense concerning the formation of the agreement to arbitrate, such as
fraud, duress, or mutual mistake.”69 By contrast, “[c]ontract defenses unrelated to the making of
the agreement – such as public policy – could not be the basis for declining to enforce an
arbitration clause.”70
This distinction makes all the difference for Thomas. As Thomas notes, the California
Supreme Court applied the Discover Bank rule to hold that “class action waivers are, under
certain circumstances, unconscionable as unlawfully exculpatory.”71 In fact, the California
Supreme Court even analogized its concerns with class action waivers to circumstances where a
contractual clause is contrary to public policy: “class action waivers [may be] substantively
unconscionable inasmuch as they may operate effectively as exculpatory contract clauses that are
contrary to public policy.”72 Indeed, Thomas highlights a number of instances where the
California Supreme Court clearly conceptualized the Discover Bank rule as precluding the
“enforce[ment]” of class action waivers because such waiver were “against the policy of law.”73
The California Supreme Court never described the Discover Bank rule as a problem of contract
formation – it clearly understood the Discover Bank rule as providing a defense to contract
enforcement.
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Accordingly, Thomas concludes that “the Discover Bank rule does not concern the
making of the arbitration agreement.”74 Instead, it is a rule aimed at preventing the enforcement
of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement akin to the rule that contracts contrary to public policy
are void. In turn, “the Discover Bank rule is not a ‘groun[d] . . . for the revocation of any
contract.’”75 It therefore functions as a defense aiming to render an otherwise valid arbitration
agreement unenforceable. Such defenses, on Thomas’s account, are pre-empted by the FAA as
only defenses speaking to contract formation remain viable under § 2.76
While both Thomas and the rest of the Court’s majority agreed to strike down the
Discover Bank rule, their divergent interpretations of the FAA would require different outcomes
where, for example, an unconscionability claim rested on concerns regarding procedural
unconscionability. Consider the facts of Olvera v. El Pollo Loco, a 2009 case before the
California Court of Appeal.77 As described by the court, El Pollo Loco – a fast food franchise –
provided employees with written materials that included provisions addressing the method of
resolving disputes between employees and the company.78 In the explanatory section – written in
both English and Spanish – the company stated that “If all attempts to resolve the problem are
unsuccessful, the new policy requires that the employee and the company use a mediator to assist
them in reaching a resolution. See your General Manager for additional details.”79 This section
made no mention of arbitration.80 By contrast, the material contained an arbitration provision –
only provided in English and without a Spanish translation – that stated the parties “may agree” to
arbitration but that “the sole means to resolve any dispute not resolved through other means was
through arbitration.”81 Moreover, the un-translated arbitration provision was in smaller type and
appeared at the end of the packet, while the mediation provision was front and center in the
materials provided to the employees.82 The arbitration provision also contained a class-action
waiver.83
Not surprisingly, the court found the arbitration provision unconscionable.84 In its
analysis, the court focused on the “high” degree of procedural unconscionability; this was not
merely a contract of adhesion, but the incorporation of the English-only arbitration provision –
which contradicted the translated mediation provision – misled the employees as to the terms of
the new dispute resolution policy.85 The class-action waiver, according to the court, also rendered
the arbitration provision substantively unconscionable although the court did not describe the
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degree of substantive unconscionability as high.86 In this way, the court voided the arbitration
provision by relying heavily on procedural unconscionability.87
El Pollo Loco serves as an example where the majority opinion and Thomas would likely
diverge.88 While the majority would likely reject a finding of unconscionability predicated on a
class-action waiver, Thomas would presumably embrace such a finding so long as the
unconscionability claim rested primarily on the procedural side; in that way, the claim of
unconscionability – like the claim in El Pollo Loco – would speak to formation as opposed to
enforcement. Thus, in contrast to the majority’s opinion, Thomas’s concurrence embraces a set
of state law claims – claims related to the formation of the agreement – that can still undermine
the viability of arbitration agreements.89
Of course, recognizing the impact of Thomas’s concurrence is only half the story. This is
because Thomas did sign on to the majority’s opinion.90 At first blush, there is good reason to
believe that by signing on to the majority’s opinion, Thomas rendered his concurrence irrelevant
as a matter of precedent.
However, such a dismissal would be premature. In 1977, the Supreme Court somewhat
famously adopted the “Marks Rule,” which provided “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds . . . .”91 While the Marks Rule, by its terms, would not appear to apply
where – as in Concepcion – five justices have assented to a single opinion of the court, federal
courts have, in some instances, deployed the rule in a wider range of circumstances.
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For example, in Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court’s majority held that the First Amendment
provided no privilege for reporters called to testify before a grand jury regarding criminal
charges.92 Justice Powell signed the Court’s majority opinion, serving as the ever-important fifth
vote. However, Justice Powell also authored a concurring opinion, where he stated “[t]he
asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance
between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with
respect to criminal conduct.”93 In turn, “[t]he balance of these vital constitutional and societal
interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such
questions.94 In this way, Justice Powell’s concurrence differed from the majority opinion,
contending that the First Amendment could provide reporters with immunity from testifying
before a grand jury depending on the circumstances.95
In applying Branzburg, lower courts have frequently considered Powell’s concurrence as
limiting the holding of the majority.96 As some have noted, such analysis appears predicated on
the fact that Powell provided the fifth and deciding vote and simultaneously Powell’s concurrence
limited the majority opinion’s holding.97 While courts continue to differ over the application of
Branzburg, it seems clear that Powell was, to some extent, successful in hijacking the Court’s
majority opinion by providing a different – and conflicting – rationale in his concurrence.98
Moreover, Branzburg may not be the only instance where a justice was able to limit the
precedential impact of a Supreme Court decision by both signing the majority opinion and writing
a conflicting concurrence.99
In this way, Branzburg and cases like it indicate that Thomas’s concurrence may have
significant impact in the application of Concepcion going forward. This is particularly true
according to those who understand precedent not in terms of the best current understanding of the
law, but in terms of predicting how courts – and most notably the Supreme Court – are likely to
resolve future cases. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously expressed this “predictive” view of
precedent: “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
what I mean by the law.”100 Thus, understanding precedent through the prism of a predictive
model takes a “forward-looking view of the law” where “an inferior court discharges its duty to
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say what the law is by applying the dispositional rule that the superior court enjoying revisory
jurisdiction predictably would embrace.”101
Along such lines, courts may very well limit the application of Concepcion, refraining
from applying the Court’s analysis to cases of unconscionability predicated on conduct that
undermines the formation of the agreement. Indeed, Thomas’s concurrence has already begun to
creep into judicial opinions, providing further indication of its potential to limit the impact of
Concepcion.102 In this way, Thomas’s concurrence provides another important reason for why
Concepcion may not cover quite as much legal terrain as some have suggested.

IV.

POLITICS

As noted above, both the majority and concurring opinions in Concepcion provide
resources for limiting Concepcion’s precedential impact. On the one hand, the majority’s opinion
is susceptible to a more narrow reading where common law grounds for contract revocation might
still render arbitration agreements unenforceable so long as they take the entirety of the
agreement into account. On the other hand, Thomas’s concurrence may be interpreted by lower
courts to limit the precedential impact of Concepcion, with the Court’s holding only applying to
instances where the common law contract doctrine serves as grounds for revocation as opposed to
a defense against contract formation.
But there is also another reason to wonder whether Concepcion’s impact will be more
limited than some have anticipated. In considering Concepcion, it is hard not to be struck by the
tenuous nature of the Court’s five-vote majority. In the past, both Justice Thomas and Justice
Scalia have expressly contested the Supreme Court’s holding in Southland Corp. v. Keating,103
which held that the FAA applies in state courts. Thus, Justice Scalia has stated that “[a]dhering to
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Southland entails a permanent, unauthorized eviction of state-court power to adjudicate a
potentially large class of disputes.”104 Similarly, Justice Thomas has described the Court’s
decision in Southland as simply “wrong,” forcefully arguing that “[t]he statute that Congress
enacted [i.e. the FAA] actually applies only in federal courts.”105 And while Justice Scalia has
stated that he will “not in the future dissent from judgments that rest on Southland,”106 Justice
Thomas has made no such concession. To the contrary, Justice Thomas has been highly critical
of the use of stare decisis to insulate Southland: “Rather than attempting to defend Southland on
its merits, petitioners rely chiefly on the doctrine of stare decisis in urging us to adhere to our
mistaken interpretation of the FAA. In my view, that doctrine is insufficient to save
Southland.”107
That Justice Thomas remains unwilling to join decisions resting on Southland’s premise
that the FAA applies in state courts is crucial to predicting future lower court application of
Concepcion. As Aaron Bruhl has argued, state courts engage in various forms of “strategic
judging,” by “choos[ing] the grounds for their decisions in ways that reach a desired result and
simultaneously make it difficult for higher courts to review their decisions.”108 This has been
particularly true in the context of arbitration as “some judges disagree with the Supreme Court’s
strongly pro-arbitration course, are willing to oppose it, and will take the survivability of their
doctrinal choices into account when fashioning their arbitration rulings.”109
This type of strategic judging has manifested itself in the increasing number of state
courts deploying the doctrine of unconscionability to void otherwise valid arbitration
agreements.110 Unconscionability became the doctrine of choice for courts resistant to the
increasing scope of enforceable arbitration agreements because it provided them with sufficient
doctrinal cover to avoid reversal on appeal.111 Indeed, the Supreme Court took critical notice of
this trend in Concepcion,112 a trend that undoubtedly factored into the Court striking down the
Discover Bank rule.
At first blush, the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion peeled back this doctrinal
cover, arguing that judicial use of unconscionability had simply become a smokescreen for the
widespread failure to put arbitration agreements on “equal footing” with all other contracts.113
And by calling out state courts for this type of decision-making, Concepcion goes far in
undermining this increasingly popular judicial tactic.
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But given the penchant of courts to engage in strategic judging, Concepcion will only be
as strong as its weakest link. And one has to imagine that state courts are fully aware of Justice
Thomas’s unrelenting criticism of Southland. Indeed, if Concepcion had made its way before the
Supreme Court via California courts, the outcome of the case would likely have been the opposite
with Justice Thomas unwilling to join a majority opinion resting on Southland’s premise that the
FAA applies in state courts. Put more starkly, state courts must be fully aware that the Supreme
Court – as currently constituted – will not reverse any of their decisions in which they continue to
apply rules similar to those struck down in Concepcion.114
Already some courts have begun to cabin the Supreme Court’s holding in Concepcion as
“preempt[ing] California’s unconscionability law regarding exemption of certain claims from
arbitration, at least for actions in federal court.”115 This implied limitation of Concepcion has
even become explicit in some recent state court decisions. On the one hand, a recent
Massachusetts state court explicitly rejected this argument, concluding that “[c]ounting the votes
of justices is always perilous.”116 On the other hand, and maybe not surprisingly, a California
state court recently noted the possibility that Justice Thomas’s continued unwillingness to join
decisions resting on Southland might limit the applicability of Supreme Court decisions that
include Justice Thomas in the majority;117 the court, however, failed to reach the issue simply
because the contentions of the parties enabled the court to avoid the question.118
To be sure, it is far from clear that as a doctrinal matter, Justice Thomas’s continued
dissent from Southland should impact the applicability of Concepcion to state courts. Indeed,
there are some good reasons to think it should not.119 But if we agree that state courts engage in
strategic judging, there is also good reason to think that – at least on the margins – some state
courts may exhibit an increasing willingness to limit the impact of decisions such as Concepcion
that, as a public policy matter, they find objectionable.120
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Consider the following example. In California, the Labor Code Private Attorneys
General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), allows “a civil action [to be] brought by an aggrieved employee
on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees” to recover civil penalties
for violations of the labor code.121 However, employees attempting to bring such class actions
under PAGA have often had to overcome employment agreements that contain both arbitration
provisions and class action waivers. Prior to Concepcion, California courts had held that
arbitration agreements with class action waivers function to prevent plaintiffs “from seeking civil
penalties on behalf of other employees, contrary to the PAGA,” and therefore such agreements
were “as a whole . . . tainted with illegality and . . . unenforceable.”122
In the wake of Concepcion, courts have been asked to consider whether or not this
holding remains good law. In a recent decision, a federal district court for the Central District of
California concluded that the Court’s decision in Concepcion rendered PAGA preempted by the
FAA.123 Citing Concepcion, the district court noted that “the Supreme Court held that, under the
FAA, states could not ‘condition[] the enforceability of . . . arbitration agreements on the
availability of classwide arbitration procedures.’”124 Further summarizing Concepcion, the
district court noted that “The [Supreme] Court concluded that requiring class arbitration when an
arbitration agreement precluded it was ‘inconsistent with the FAA’ because class arbitration
‘sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process slower,
more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment’ and because
‘class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants,’ as ‘[t]he absence of multilayered review
makes it more likely that errors will go uncorrected.’”125
The district court then analogized the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Discover Bank rule
to PAGA, holding that the plaintiff’s claims pursuant to PAGA were arbitrable.126 The analogy,
according to the district court, was straightforward:
For similar reasons, requiring arbitration agreements to allow for
representative PAGA claims on behalf of other employees would be
inconsistent with the FAA. A claim brought on behalf of others would,
like class claims, make for a slower, more costly process. In addition,
representative PAGA claims “increase[] risks to defendants” by
aggregating the claims of many employees. . . . Defendants would run
the risk that an erroneous decision on a PAGA claim on behalf of many
employees would “go uncorrected” given the “absence of multilayered
review.”127

Thus, “[j]ust as ‘[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation,’ it is
also poorly suited to the higher stakes of a collective PAGA action.”128 As a result, the district
court interpreted Concepcion to prevent California’s PAGA from rendering such claims non-
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arbitrable: “AT&T v. Concepcion makes clear, however, that the state cannot impose such a
requirement because it would be inconsistent with the FAA.”129
The district court’s analysis is quite persuasive. Like the Discover Bank rule, PAGA
protected a set of claims by ensuring a plaintiff could bring a representative suit. In turn,
plaintiffs have sought to deploy PAGA in order to avoid arbitration agreements that incorporate
class action waivers. In this way, PAGA encapsulated a California state public policy, which
served to void otherwise valid arbitration agreements; and, under Concepcion, such a state law
would appear to be preempted by the FAA when applied to arbitration agreements.
But this argument, while persuasive in federal courts, has not been adopted in California
state court. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the California Court of Appeal argued that
PAGA claims are fundamentally different from typical class action claims. According to the
court, “[t]he representative action authorized by the PAGA is an enforcement action, with one
aggrieved employee acting as a private attorney general to collect penalties from employers who
violate the Labor Code.”130 As expressed in prior California decisional law, “Such an action is
fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the public and penalize the employer
for past illegal conduct. Restitution is not the primary object of a PAGA action, as it is in most
class actions.”131 Indeed, “The [PAGA] attempted to remedy the understaffing of California’s
labor law enforcement agencies by granting employees the authority to bring civil actions against
their employers for Labor Code violations.”132
Prior California decisions had been unwilling to allow contractual provisions to
undermine the objectives of PAGA: “efforts to ‘nullify the PAGA and preclude [the plaintiff]
from seeking civil penalties on behalf of other current and former employees, that is, from
performing the core function of a private attorney general . . . impedes [the] goal of
‘comprehensive[ly] enforc[ing]’ a statutory scheme through the imposition of ‘statutory
sanctions’ and ‘fines.’ . . . [And] the prohibition of private attorneys general is invalid.”133
Based on this distinction, the California Court of Appeal determined that Concepcion’s
holding did not render PAGA claims arbitrable. According to the court, Concepcion “concerns
the preemption of unconscionability determinations for class action waivers in consumer cases”
and thereby “specifically deals with the rule enunciated in Discover Bank . . .”134 By contrast,
Concepcion “does not purport to deal with the FAA’s possible preemption of contractual efforts
to eliminate representative private attorney general actions to enforce the Labor Code.”135 Under
PAGA, the “aggrieved employee acts as the proxy or agent of state labor law enforcement
agencies, representing the same legal right and interest as those agencies, in a proceeding that is
designed to protect the public, not to benefit private parties.”136 In this way, “[t]he purpose of the
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PAGA is not to recover damages or restitution, but to create a means of ‘deputizing’ citizens as
private attorneys general to enforce the Labor Code.”137
According to the court, “[t]his purpose contrasts with the private individual right of a
consumer to pursue class action remedies in court or arbitration, which right, according to AT&T,
may be waived by agreement so as not to frustrate the FAA—a law governing private
arbitrations.”138 And in turn, Concepcion “does not provide that a public right, such as that
created under the PAGA, can be waived if such a waiver is contrary to state law.”139 Thus the
court concluded, “representative actions under the PAGA do not conflict with the purposes of the
FAA. If the FAA preempted state law as to the unenforceability of the PAGA representative
action waivers, the benefits of private attorney general actions to enforce state labor laws would,
in large part, be nullified.”140
It is somewhat hard to understand why this distinction should make a difference. While it
may be true that the purpose of PAGA is different than the purpose of the Discover Bank rule,
PAGA’s authorizing representative actions on the part of aggrieved employees does conflict with
arbitration agreements that incorporate class action waivers. In turn, if Concepcion held that the
Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA because it undermines the enforceability of
otherwise valid arbitration agreements, it is hard to see why the different purpose of PAGA
should prevent the FAA from rendering it preempted.141
In its decision, the California Court of Appeal appeared to acknowledge the tenuousness
of its arguments. Indeed, somewhat candidly, the court “recognize[d] that the United States
Supreme Court has held that the FAA preempts certain California statutory dispute resolution
mechanisms.”142 However, the court was unwilling to expand the logic of Concepcion – and
other similar Supreme Court decisions – insisting that “United States Supreme Court authority
does not address a statute such as the PAGA.”143 In a somewhat explicit show of judicial
defiance, the court stated “Until the United States Supreme Court rules otherwise, we continue to
follow what we believe to be California law.”144
This refusal to expand Concepcion beyond its narrow circumstances captures much of the
strategic judging dynamic. Aware that the Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse its decision, the
California Court of Appeal was willing to push back against Concepcion’s logic and reassert the
authority of the state to require judicial resolution of PAGA claims. It did so by highlighting a
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distinction with little difference between the Discover Bank rule and PAGA, presumably aware
that state court decisions are unlikely to receive significant scrutiny from the Supreme Court
given the fractured nature of the Court’s majority regarding the applicability of the FAA to state
courts. In turn, the California Court of Appeal sticks to its doctrinal guns, daring the Supreme
Court to “rule[] otherwise.”145 And until the Supreme Court does in fact rule otherwise, the
California Court of Appeal has clearly stated who makes the law in state court: “we continue to
follow what we believe to be California law.”146
This is, of course, not to say that all California state courts – or all state courts generally –
will uniformly resist the implications of Concepcion. Indeed, some court decisions might
embrace Concepcion and apply the Supreme Court’s holding more conventionally.147 But bold
responses to Concepcion – like the court’s decision in Brown – may become increasingly typical
for state courts that wish to resist the expansion of the FAA’s preemptive scope. Such courts are
undoubtedly aware of how tenuous the Supreme Court’s majority is and are therefore likely
dubious of the Supreme Court’s ability to strike down state court decisions rejecting the
expansive reading of the FAA embodied in Concepcion. While as a matter of technical doctrine
such decisions may be flawed, state courts are likely to erect more hurdles to the Supreme Court’s
broad interpretation of the FAA’s preemptive scope than their federal counterparts. And such
willingness presumably draws, at least in part, from the inability of the Supreme Court to marshal
a unified majority to quash state court decisions that reject the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration
trajectory.148 As a result, there is good reason to believe that Concepcion will have a more
limited impact on state court decisions than we might otherwise think.

V.

CONCLUSION

Concepcion was undoubtedly a landmark decision that will have broad impact on the
ability of courts to deploy common law contract defenses to void arbitration agreements. Indeed,
the decision, by its terms, limits the use of unconscionability as a doctrine of last resort – a
doctrine that had become increasingly popular in recent judicial decisions.149
That being said, there are reasons to believe that Concepcion’s reach will not be quite as
broad as some might think. First, the Court’s decision may be read as simply rejecting the
creation of overly-broad rules that apply common law doctrines to void arbitration agreements.
On such an account, the Discover Bank rule undermined the purpose of the FAA by voiding to
wide a swath of arbitration agreements – including arbitration agreements that incorporated proconsumer terms to counterbalance the impact of class action waivers. Second, Justice Thomas’s
concurrence in Concepcion may be used by lower courts to limit the precedential value of the
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Court’s holding to instances where the implicated defense speaks to the revocation of an
otherwise valid arbitration agreement – as opposed to instances where the implicated defense
speaks to the formation of the agreement. And third, state courts may engage in strategic judging
in light of the division within the five-justice Concepcion majority over the applicability of the
FAA to state courts. In this way, while Concepcion may have changed the landscape of
arbitration doctrine, resources remain for plaintiffs to resist the most recent manifestation of the
Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence.
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